Numbers Games: How Many Troops Are Needed for the "Surge"? by Frederick Kagan

The President's "surge" has had a remarkably short honeymoon. Here are the
complaints of one of its intellectual architects, Fred Kagan at AEI. This
is also available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25473,filter.all/pub_detail.asp
 
Numbers Games How Many Troops Are Needed for the "Surge"?
By Frederick W.
Kagan Posted: Thursday,
January 18, 2007
ARTICLES Daily
Standard   Publication
Date: January 18, 2007

Critics of the plan proposed by the American Enterprise Institute's Iraq
Planning Group (IPG) have been pointing to supposed discrepancies in the numbers
of troops required to secure Baghdad in my writings, the IPG, and the Bush
administration's statements.

Resident Scholar Frederick W. Kagan

I noted before the IPG met that it would
require a surge of 80,000 additional troops to clear the entire Baghdad capital
area, according to traditional counter-insurgency norms and under a variety of
other unlikely conditions. I did not advocate such an operation. I noted
consistently, again before the IPG met, that I thought it would take about
50,000 additional U.S. troops to clear and hold all of Baghdad, but I also noted
that we could clear parts of the city with fewer forces in a rational, phased
plan.

I then put together a team of military planning and regional experts in an
attempt to determine with more accuracy exactly how many forces would be
required. The results were published in our report, Choosing
Victory. We came to the conclusion that the best approach would focus
on the most critical areas of Baghdad--the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia
neighborhoods around the Green Zone on both sides of the river--and that
clearing and holding those areas would require a surge of 5 Army Brigade Combat
Teams, or about 25,000 troops. We did not attempt to calculate the number of
support troops that would be an essential part of such a surge because it was
beyond the means of a group as small as ours to do so--such calculations require
a large military planning staff with access to much more detailed information
about our force deployment than we had available.

Because of the possible confusion surrounding the number of troops in each
kind of unit, the IPG focused on the number of brigades and regiments. This
remains the best way to consider proposed surges or reductions. Nevertheless,
the number of troops on the ground is an important issue and merits
consideration. In my estimation, the total surge required in Baghdad would be on
the order of 35,000 troops or so--including the additional support forces. The
IPG also came to the conclusion that it was important to deploy two additional
Marine Regimental Combat Teams to al Anbar province--around 7,000 combat troops;
maybe 10,000 with all their support elements. The total additional deployment of
forces we proposed would then be around 45,000 soldiers and Marines, split
between Anbar and Baghdad. This was the considered evaluation of a group of
active duty and retired Army officers and regional experts, and I accepted their
conclusions as likely to be more accurate than my earlier estimates. I stand by
the proposals of the IPG.

The Bush administration briefings on the numbers involved in their plan are
complex. They are briefing a surge of as many as five brigades into Baghdad and
one regiment into al Anbar (although they are also indicating that they now
intend to send only two brigades immediately into Baghdad, holding the other
three in reserve to be deployed as needed). They are saying that five brigades
contain around 17,500 troops, and the regiment around 4,000 troops, for a total
surge of around 21,500 soldiers and Marines. Critics of our plans point to the
discrepancy between the IPG's recommendation of 35,000 combat troops, and the
administration's discussion of fewer than 22,000 combat troops. Note that
neither the IPG nor the administration is listing the number of additional
support troops that would be necessary.

A U.S. Army brigade now contains by statute two maneuver battalions (combat
forces), one artillery battalion, and a number of other support elements that
are a permanent part of its organization. Brigades deploying to Iraq do not need
large artillery formations, and so they train their artillery battalions as
infantry, creating effectively three maneuver battalions. Brigade sizes range
based on the type of unit, but average around 3,500 soldiers each. The
administration's figures are based on that estimate.

In reality, the U.S. Army does not simply deploy brigades into combat, but
instead sends Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). A BCT includes a brigade as described
above, but also additional support elements such as engineers, military police,
additional logistics elements, and so on, which are necessary to the functioning
of the brigade in combat. In a counter-insurgency operation such as Iraq, these
additional forces are fully as important to the overall success of the mission
as the combat troops. Sizes of BCTs also vary, of course, but they average more
like 5,000 soldiers. Since these are the formations that will actually be
deployed to Iraq and used there, I have been estimating deployments on this
basis: five brigade combat teams include around 25,000 soldiers; one Marine
Regimental Combat Team (RCTs are somewhat smaller than Army brigades) includes
perhaps 4,000. So the surge being briefed by the Bush administration now is much
more likely to be around 29,000 troops than 22,000--in other words, close to the
number of combat troops the IPG recommended, and, when necessary support troops
are added, close to the overall numbers I had estimated before the IPG met.

It remains to be seen if the Bush administration will adhere to this plan, of
course. The notion of deploying the first two brigades while holding the other
three in reserve is antithetical to the plan produced by the IPG, and I do not
believe it to be sound. Neither am I entirely satisfied with the reduction of
Marine RCTs designated for Anbar from two to one. Other elements of the
administration's plan are also significantly at variance with the proposal of
the IPG, especially the administration's emphasis on putting Iraqis in the lead
at all levels, including the tactical and sub-tactical level. But the new
commander, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, has not yet taken up command, and
it would be best to await his plan before commenting in detail on proposals that
may or may not take concrete form.

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at
AEI.