THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BLACK MARKET

From the outset, Pakistani governments gave A.Q. Khan a remarkable degree of authority and autonomy, partly because of the highly sensitive nature of his work, and partly because he was able to achieve tangible results. Concerns about foreign intelligence operations targeting Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and the increased secrecy and compartmentalisation that resulted, allowed Khan to operate more independently. An unhealthy rivalry with other Pakistani nuclear organisations contributed to even greater secrecy and shady business practices. Unquestioned, Khan began to order many more components than Pakistan’s own enrichment programme required.

Khan’s contacts with Iran date from the mid 1980s, and extended into the following decade. Khan probably had some signal, if not explicit permission, from his superiors for nuclear cooperation with Iran. However, no evidence has yet emerged that a clear directive was ever given to Khan to provide nuclear technology to Iran. Khan provided Iran with centrifuges, technical designs, components and an ‘address book’ of suppliers. Some details concerning exactly what Iran received are still uncertain. What is clear is that Khan’s sales helped Iran to make significant advances in its clandestine nuclear programme.

 

How much help Khan gave Iran and North Korea and whether the Khan network had other customers are questions of intense interest to investigative agencies. What happened with the rest of the nuclear equipment the Khan network had but did not send to Libya is another of the major questions remaining after the network was broken up, along with what other countries or non-state actors may also have received copies of a nuclear weapon design besides Libya. The bomb designs were apparently digitalised and copied onto computer disks at one of Khan’s offices in Dubai. One of the Swiss members of the network admitted to having atomic bomb construction plans in his own office. Swiss and American authorities, as well as the IAEA, have been trying to discover what other use may have been made of these bomb designs, including the alarming scenario of whether any copies were sold to terrorist groups.

Pakistan has never made public Khan’s confession, the details of its investigation into the network, including who was arrested and who was simply detained ‘for debriefing,’ the charges and laws under which Khan’s associates were detained, the grounds for their release, or the identities of those who were put under a form of continued ‘house arrest’. The lack of transparency extends to Pakistan’s interactions with other governments. Privately, officials in various Western capitals are frustrated that Pakistan has stopped providing information on the grounds that the Khan interrogation is complete.
Light sentences meted out to nuclear scientists who met Osama bin Laden reflect a disturbing pattern reminiscent of the secrecy with which Khan was dealt. The understandable need to protect national security secrets conflicts with the government’s desire to dispel hints of lingering corruption in the nuclear programme, notwithstanding the multilayered internal security system that Pakistan has implemented since Khan’s heyday.