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Stability in Iraq: A War We Just Might Win
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by scotty_ng1 | August 9, 2007 at 10:18 am
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Stability in Iraq: A War We Just Might Win
The New York Times, July 30, 2007
cont <* name="name" value="Michael E. O'Hanlon"> occurs here -->Michael E. O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
cont <* name="name" value="Kenneth M. Pollack"> occurs here -->Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Viewed from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration's critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.
Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily "victory" but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.
After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated—many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.
Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.
Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services—electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation—to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began—though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.
In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks—all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups—who were now competing to secure his friendship.
In Baghdad's Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.
We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.
But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).
In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army's highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.
In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few "jundis" (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless—something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.
The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus's determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.
In war, sometimes it's important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.
Another surprise was how well the coalition's new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.
In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.
Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.
In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation—or at least accommodation—are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.
How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.
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Most RecentMost Recommended Comments (12)
at 10:28 on August 9th, 2007
I do agree that US and Iraqi forces have made great progress securing Baghdad and other hotspots in the last month, relative to the previous glut of carnage. So Iraq has improved from "hopeless" to "nasty". But again, the bar for success was so low since Iraq was in such a terrible security state the last 3 years (and especially the last 2 years). The surge strategy of "clear-hold-retain" is not so innovative, so why didn't our leaders and generals implement it years ago, when the insurgency was less experienced/organized, and we had the initiative, more goodwill among Muslims, and more domestic support for the war?
Of course on the political side of things, Iraq has a long way to go (and Parliament just took another vacation with very little accomplished). Their leaders do not seem interested in tailoring their political decisions to meet US timetables, nor should they. It's their country and they need to resolve issues and implement policies on their own terms, not under US pressures.
at 12:39 on August 9th, 2007
scotty_ng1, Good stuff.
I think somone already posted this story, but its a good one to repeat.
at 13:04 on August 9th, 2007
Oops, beat me to the punch. :) Thanks for letting me know and talk to you next time. It's a relief that troop morale seems to be improving after a long period of frustration and bad news/declining public support at home.
at 06:43 on August 10th, 2007
I find this story quite incredible. Obviously the NY times has either gone insane or the US media is now totally under some ones control. Sorry scotty this is complete nonsense. I have never seen that flag before so the image proves this is just silly propaganda. The truth is Basra has fallen to Hiz-ut-Tahir (an Uzbek Group and others too) and the US supply lines are now severly threatened. As for a reduction to the Violence, that is also an outright lie. More US troops have been killed this July than any other July since the invasion. Things are looking very grim and the US is now on its own in Iraq as the UK is about to romve the last of their troops and Australia will pull there troops out before the end of the year. The USA has no more troops to committ to the feild and the casualty rates are about 10x higher than reported. Thats why they say 3500 troops "Killed in Iraq" that does not include the Green zones or US bases there, whiuch are US soverign territory and the 30,00 troops who have died of their wounds at Rota and Rammstein etc. I wonder when Bush plans to tell the US public just how many troops have really been killed
at 08:52 on August 10th, 2007
Its all a big hush hush conspiracy against the mindless American population. By the way how did you get all this info?
btw: which flag do you refer to? The one with the stripes and stars or the red one with the gold embroidery? I bet they just make random flags to throw off the ignorant Americans since they have no idea what all these colorfull flags mean anyway.
Keep up the good work.
at 06:48 on August 11th, 2007
That silly red flag Its not any Iraqi resitance flag I have ever seen. Islamists Use Black Green and sometines yellow usually with some sacred text on it and the Name of the organization.
How did I get the info. I did the Math. There is no way these numbers could be correct. I estimate that many of them have been crispied in M1a1/2 Tanks alone. I work in World news and I started to sense something was very wrong with AP's reporting of the deaths, so a little google work and you will also see that its just not possible, in fact I would put another Zero on it. Also the US gov. are using those very specific phrases, like "President Bush is NOT spying on US citizens under THIS program" etc. so technically they are not lying so will probably not end up in court.
at 12:02 on August 10th, 2007
Iraq is getting better from a security standpoint, though we should remember the big picture. If we need to heavily fortify the Green Zone (and still some bombs/mortars get through), separate hostile peoples with barbed wire and blast walls, enforce curfews, "police the police", and have planes take off/land in corkscrew flight paths to avoid rocket fire over Baghdad, maybe something is gravely wrong with that country that extends beyond superficial security concerns. You can't claim that you are a good parent with a well-behaved kid if you need to gag and bind the boy in a straightjacket to prevent him from running amok.
For now, it seems that US forces are absolutely mandatory for preventing chaos over there, and that is not good because everyone knows we can't stay forever (despite the desires of some in power). Though the doomsday scenario that Bush touts is somewhat unlikely (if we exit, the conflict will spread across the Middle East with S Arabia, Iran, and others getting involved and driving the price of oil sky high). We help mitigate the domestic sectarian conflict, but the US military can't babysit them forever. It's bad for them (dependent on us, less urgency for reconciliation, country disrupted by foreign troops) and bad for us (expensive both financially and politically). We are keeping a lid on their civil war, but our presence there inspires anti-occupation violence and nationalistic resistance too.
Some follow-up stories from NPR today:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12668623
Vietnam Lessons Could Shape Iraq Exit
by Steve Inskeep and Ted Koppel
Morning Edition, August 10, 2007 · The question of how best to walk away from Iraq is on the minds of Americans. President Bush wants to hand more of the conflict to Iraqis; many of his opponents simply want out. Lessons learned from Vietnam might shed some light on exiting Iraq — decision-makers from back then are serving in the current administration.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12668620
Iraq's Interior Ministry Strikes Fear Post Saddam
by Jamie Tarabay
Morning Edition, August 10, 2007 · Iraq's Interior Ministry is as feared today as it was under Saddam Hussein despite being so fractured along sectarian lines.
Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the ministry served as the pervasive, terrifying intelligence arm of Hussein's Baath Party, which kept a file on every Iraqi.
Now Iraq's main political parties are fighting to control the ministry, crippling attempts to reform the country's corrupt and sectarian police force.
Located outside of Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone, security around the Interior Ministry complex is stringent. Cars aren't allowed to stop near the entrance, and loiters are shooed away by twitchy police fearing suicide bombers.
Inside the outer gate, men in faded shirts walk single file — after getting pat down — carrying their belongings in see-through plastic bags. They're policemen, but they only change into their uniforms once they enter the ministry.
Once inside the ministry there are more security checks: mobile phones are confiscated to prevent anyone giving information on the movements of employees. And guns are everywhere. Adhering to standard procedure, a western official escorting reporters pulls out his handgun before he enters the building.
Iraqi police at the front desk stiffen at the sight of strangers. No one gets anywhere in the squalid 11-storey building without a permit.
A senior Shiite police officer, who calls himself Ali Kamil, said the ministry is split into hostile armed camps.
"The whole ministry is plagued — each floor represents a state of its own, a party or a certain group," he said. "The Shiite parties want to get rid of the Sunni ones. The Sunnis want to get rid of the Shiite ones. The Kurdish parties want the Sunnis and the Shiites to fight each other. They are all wrestling and sometimes they even liquidate their rivals."
It's practically impossible to walk the dusty hallways of the building without the shadow of former Interior Minister Bayan Jabr looming. He was leader of a Shiite paramilitary group, and he brought thousands of militiamen into the ranks of the police force.
People here say Jabr ran the ministry in a climate of fear, mistrust and corruption. Jabr was removed from the Interior Ministry in May 2006, and given the government's finance portfolio.
His successor at the Interior Ministry is Jawad Bolani, who said he has fired 16,000 employees of the ministry in the past year on charges of corruption and other crimes.
"It's a work in progress; we have thousands of cases we're investigating. We have a long way ahead of us to create a ministry that is balanced and structured fairly," Bolani said.
Bolani is a Shiite who served in Iraq's air force for 15 years. This is his first senior government position. He is reputed to be independent of any of the major political parties, but observers fear the Interior Ministry's divisions run too deep to be bridged anytime soon. It's a microcosm of Iraq and its conflicts.
Kamil said: "There are different groups and each one of them is holding a string. So what is happening now is no on can make decisions because everyone pulls his string in different directions. They are not united."
Minister Bolani says he's focused on retraining, weeding out disloyal police, and replacing commanders accused of kidnappings and killings.
"There are negative things about government institutions like the Interior Ministry, but we shouldn't forget sacrifices made by the police and the suffering of their families," he said. "More than 15,000 policemen, including both Sunnis and Shiites have been killed in the violence here."
Inside the ministry, clusters of policemen in different uniforms watch warily as people go up and down the crumbling stairs. Despite the new minister's efforts at reform, Iraq's main political factions continue to battle for supremacy inside the ministry.
People like Kamil fear when U.S. forces will leave Iraq, every man with a gun here will stand and fight, but for his political party not for his country.
at 12:16 on August 10th, 2007
Thanks for the comments friends. SthPacific: by no means do I think that things are "going well" in Iraq. But from the abysmal state of affairs in 2006, summer 2007 is showing signs of improvement. We'll see what Petraeus says when he goes to DC in September. But I can't imagine any commanding general telling politicians that he is losing a fight. I hope he can give an honest assessment, but I know he is looking after his career too. Regarding Iraq security, when you start from rock bottom, even the smallest improvement is noticeable. Yes many US troops have died in 2007 and far more Iraqis too, which is tragic. Though the clear-hold-retain operations are quite challenging, so of course soldiers will be under attack in transit or combat operations. That is the way the occupation has always been, but now we have more fighting units on the ground confronting hostiles, so of course our casualties will rise. I think the important metric is: are we protecting Iraqis better? Are Iraqis seeing improvement in their daily lives and safety situation? If the answer is yes, then we are on the right path and should continue. If the answer is no, then we need to rethink our strategy or prepare for withdrawal if we feel the battle is hopeless. Is the Baghdad government holding up their end of the bargain? I am not sure, and I don't think we can really influence them into cooperation anyway.
at 08:28 on August 13th, 2007
SthPacific: I think the red flag is the Marine Corps flag.
http://www.marinecorpspins.com/marine_flag_history.html
at 18:11 on August 13th, 2007
Agreed
at 07:49 on August 16th, 2007
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12800966
This guy pretty much sums up why we are F-ed in Iraq now: even if the Surge manages to improve stability, the political climate is so dysfunctional among the idiot Iraqi leaders we placed in power (mostly pro-Western exiles like Chalabi and Maliki who don't enjoy any public support over there). The antiwar effort lost. Pentagon and White House planners are preparing for a "decades long" US presence over there. Sure we can't maintain over 160,000 troops over there indefinitely, but we aren't getting ready to leave any time soon.
at 00:47 on August 17th, 2007
Sorry about not updating that thnig on the flag I realized after I commented, the Gild Fringe gives it away.
As for me the War ended when the Generals came out and revealed one of the things your enemy should NEVER know. What your army cant do. At first I thought they should have been shot for treason but later I started getting emails from a source close to Russian inttel, and it turns out they were reading the whole of O.I.F in real time. This was made public enough to absolve there people from the charge of treason. Sadly not only did this reveal that the US is probably a paper tiger, but it seems the Russian are hell bent on proving this. So far they are doing a great job.
There is ofcourse no way the US can keep these troop levels up and the Army is not just fatigued to the point of collapse the the equipment loss and arsenal depletion will mean many more of your troops will now start to die for a lost war with no hope of victory. The new tactics of being nice to the Iraqi people are just to late now to make a difference. I think that more pressure will have to be placed on the Government not to just withdraw from Iraq but Afghanistan as well. Afghanistan will make Iraq look like a picnic if the US tries to re-invade this territory. While the US army may have a slight technologiacl advantage in Iraq, this is not the case in Afghanistan. The PAshtoons have beaten everyone from Alexander the Great down and the US will be no different. If Russia, who shared a common border with them could not, the US has no chance.