Afghanistan: Combat Outpost (COP) Left Vulnerable by Commanders

by Karl Gotthardt - albertacowpoke | February 6, 2010 at 04:24 am

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Commanders Held Accountable

An inquiry headed by Army Major General Guy Swan III found that Combat Outpost (COP) Keeting was left vulnerable by its Chain of Command.

Major General Guy Swan III recommends that the Squadron Commander be issued a Letter of Reprimand and the Brigade Commander a Letter of Admonishment.

Combat Outpost Left Vulnerable

Since COP Keating was considered to no longer have any tactical value the decision for its closure had been made, the report concluded.

This resulted in defenses no longer being shored up and the 60 soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, were attacked 47 times, which was three times as often as the preceding unit.

This resulted in the early morning attack on Oct 3rd in which eight soldiers were killed.

After the troops regained control of the outpost, they destroyed all sensitive equipment and the COP Keating was closed by Oct 6th.

New Push to hold Commanders Accountable

The military spends a lot of money and resources to train its field leaders. This is inherent in individual courses, field training and comprehensive pre-deployment training. Once placed in a position of trust, at the Battalion and Brigade level, you can be expected to take force protection and safety into consideration.

While it's difficult to assess each individual commander's action, this is a step in the right direction. In the past there have been too many "Yes Men (or Women)". Not questioning your superiors on issues that could negatively affect your troops will now have consequences.

Letters of of Reprimand and Admonishment will, likely, be career stoppers.

With limited manpower and located in a ravine surrounded by steep hillsides, Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry had seen its mission devolve into protecting its base, Swan concluded. During the soldiers' five months at the outpost, they were attacked about 47 times, three times as often as the unit that preceded them there, the report found.

"As a result, the chain of command decided to close the remote outpost as soon as it could," the report said.

But a scheduled midsummer closure was delayed because the equipment needed to haul away base supplies, conduct surveillance and gather intelligence was sent elsewhere, the report said.

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YankeeJim

at 07:16 on February 6th, 2010

This story reminded me a lot of Vietanm war stories in which American troops were constantly asked to do the impossible. They threw themselves at the enemy under high command in a bodycount war.

I could understand a strategy that would call setting up an outpost that would draw in the enemy as they would be attracted to apparent vulnerability. However, that outpust would be covered high and low with airpower and reserve support such that the attackers would be immediately crushed.

From the sound of it, the outpost got ahead of the logistics to support it. That is a commander's error.

Karl Gotthardt - albertacowpoke

at 07:23 on February 6th, 2010

I agree with that Jim. In fact there is a book written by a Canadian military doctor with previous infantry experience. He writes about Forward Operational Bases (FOB). The whole concept was to lure the Taliban into a Killing Zone (KZ) and do exactly what you speak of. The book is called FOB DOC , witten by Capt Ray Wiss, MD. The book was originally intended as a war diary for his daughter but he was encouraged to publish it. It's available on amazon.com. It is certainly interesting reading from a soldier's perspective. It leaves out the politics.