Oil Extinction: The Rise of Authoritarianism

In the next century, attempts at transformation to democratic political systems and the sustainability of functioning democracies will be contingent on factors that can undermine these processes. In three of the largest nations, America, China and Russia, the unsustainable oil and gas industries and economic necessity will gravitate each of these nations towards more authoritarian forms of governments; the degree of this gravitation will be subject to the cultural predispositions of the citizenry towards democratic processes and these transformations will affect and be affected by countries affiliated with these nations
In the United States, the most powerful of the western, post-industrial nations, democracy has a long established, stable tradition that appears to show very little indication of making any major transformations in the near future. While Americans have disengaged psychologically from politics and government” since the latter half of the 20th century, there is still an expectation that the democratic system is a permanent condition. Robert Putnam, in his book, "Bowling Alone," argues that a civic society is an important precondition for democracy and democratization, and points to this erosion of the social capital within America as a sign that democracy could be undermined by an apathetic citizenry unwilling to engage in the political process. While democracy may be weakened slightly in America by political machinations that are not mandated by a large number of its citizenry, the political process has continued without interruption. Civic engagement may be affected by the movement of women into the labour force, the mobility of citizens, changing demographics and the transformation of leisure activities, but the infrastructure of the democratic political process remains unaffected at present. Caucasus and primaries are still held, federal elections still provide Presidents that reside over the same system of checks and balances that have been intrinsic to the American political system for more than a century. Civic engagement may be on the decline; however, the political system American society has become increasingly disenfranchised with has
Robert D. Kaplan, in his article, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" states democracy in the United States is at greater risk than ever before, citing the fallibility of democracies in Sudan, Rwanda, pre-WWII Germany and Italy, Kurdistan, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Venezuela, Columbia, Argentina, and Haiti. He argues that democracy is an idealistic extreme reached in opposition to the rise of communism during the cold war. Kaplan asserts that unregulated, global power of corporate entities over governments will transform democracies to become more authoritarian political systems constructed to protect the middle and upper classes from the poor. While Kaplan may have come to apparent conclusions regarding the influence of corporations over civic culture, he offers poor examples. Many of the countries Kaplan lists are actually countries with multiple other factors that undermined democratic sustainability. Rwanda, pre-WWII Germany, Sierra Leone and Congo-Brazzaville all suffered from ethnic or tribal conflict that has debilitated or completely thwarted attempts at democratization. Moreover, in most of these countries, with the exception of Germany, there is no cultural predisposition to democratic processes, thus providing us with weak examples of democratic failures to compare with the United States as they pertain to its democratic sustainability
In concordance with a different aspect of Kaplan's argument is the idea also espoused by Benjamin R. Barber in his book, "Jihad vs. McWorld." It is the unregulated power of corporations in an increasingly globalized economy that may attenuate democratic processes in the United States and abroad. According to the U.S. Department of Energy there are 1,317.447 Trillion barrels of accessible oil left in the lithosphere and this is consumed at a rate of 83 million barrels a day. At current rates of consumption this leaves less than 40 years of accessible oil. In the ten largest corporations in the world, all except Wal-mart completely rely on oil production. As the reserves dry up and prices rise, corporations will be forced to pressure governments into actions that secure sources of oil, domestic and foreign. In order to achieve this goal in a society with a long-standing cultural tradition of democracy, such as the United States, oil companies will have to inject their own politicians into the political system. When this circumstance is combined with citizens disengaging with the political process, there is a strong likelihood that governments will succumb to the demands of the oil industry and form a corporatist, authoritative approach to foreign and domestic policy. The United States, the largest importer of oil on the planet, will be especially susceptible to becoming a more corporatist, authoritarian state.
Howard J. Wiarda, in his book, "Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes," describes how "Corporatism and authoritarianism were often seen as the third way," the alternative to liberalism in pre-WWII Europe. He also describes how "corporatism is an integral, consultative feature of the modern state." While the latter quote refers to a more modern, less authoritarian form of corporatism, Wiarda fails to recognize that, under the cataclysmic circumstance of actually running out of the most important economic commodity in the world, the function of the oil industry as a consultative characteristic of the democratic process will change. With politicians funded by oil corporations in positions of power, this interest group will set an agenda that only suits its own needs as opposed to the interests of the citizenry. The result will be long-standing consolidated democracies infiltrated by corporate interests undermining the democratic process with authoritative legislation that protects access to oil. As America will be competing with other nations for foreign sources of oil, aggressive foreign policies will require a strong, capable military and a government able to manipulate media so as to circumvent the kind of civil unrest that stopped the Vietnam War. All of these circumstances require a centralized, authoritarian political system that is able to manipulate its public image so as to appear more democratic than it is. With citizens who are already desensitized to dishonest politics and disengaged from the political process, America will find this transformation to be an easy one, if it hasn’t happened already.
China is a country whose contingency corollaries include: no historical predisposition to democratic political processes, ethnic and religious violence and a confrontational relationship with America; all of which affect its democratization process. From its historical dynastic roots to the modern-day People’s Republic of China, Chinese political systems have drawn from authoritarian, Confucian philosophies. Herald Crouch and James W. Morley, in their article, "The Dynamics of Political Change," note that China, along with other Asia-Pacific countries such as Singapore, had failed to develop any form of democratic institutions by the time industrialization and rapid economic growth had begun.
Modern China claims control over 23 provinces, Taiwan included, and has the 4th largest economy in the world. With this large an economy, a renegade province, ethnic strife involving many of their 56 minorities in various provinces and a confrontational relationship with western nations, China shows no likelihood of taking on any sustainable forms of democratic processes regardless of the political motivations of a growing middle class.
China is also the 3rd largest importer of oil and will be in direct competition for the last of it with the other countries that top the list of importers: U.S., Japan, Germany, South Korea, France and India. In order to secure sources of oil, China must establish relationships with countries like Iran. The most effective means to entice Iran into offering up its oil is to be willing to buy it without expecting any changes to the political system that controls the country. Unlike America, China has no vested interest in what type of government they do business with. In the case of Iran, China has no relationship with Israel; therefore, it matters not to China if Iran threatens Israel by building a nuclear arsenal. Because China has no expectation for change, or acts of submission from its suppliers, Iran will also find an economic relationship with China more in its own interests than any economic association with a western nation, such as America, where a relationship with Israel inhibits unconditional trade in the Middle East region. Moreover, by establishing long-term business relationships with countries in confrontation with America, China will need to act from a position of strength. The authoritarian style of political system that has ruled China since its inception will meet that need. These external and internal influences lead to a continuation of the autocratic rule that stabilizes the country and has presided over China, in one form or another, since its civilization began
Crouch and Morley assert that Asian countries such as China and Singapore hold a different set of societal values than western nations. These long-held ideals hold the good of the nation and a harmonization of their societies as a whole above the need for individual human rights. At this stage of its development, Singapore has not needed to decentralize its successful growing economy, as western nations have. Achieving a vibrant, prosperous economy without surrendering an authoritarian control over its country has inspired both China and Russia to rebuff democratization and follow along a similar path.
Benjamin R. Barber, in his book, "Jihad vs. McWorld" espouses the idea that globalization will be competing with democracy. Within this geopolitical climate, corporate interests seek out markets in the lesser developed countries and establish non-governmental agendas globally in the process. Barber asserts that corporations will be disinterested in democracy and it will be the ease with which business is done that will take precedence over whether or not the business partner comes from a just society. In an authoritarian regime, such as Russia, the dynamics of these global corporate entities is changing. Following Barber's assertion that nations need what other nations have, and the pursuit of those needs is only hindered by expectations of particular political systems in the trading partner, authoritarian corporatist nations will no longer care what political ideologies form the governments of nations that supply oil. The need for oil will become such that disinterested states such as Russia, China and Singapore will be the favoured trading partners.
Russia has a recent historical pretext to consider when ascertaining the likelihood of its democratization. There is a culture fresh from the centralized form of communism from the cold war era and a leadership predisposed to kleptocratic conditions. The facade of democracy in Russia is explored by David Remnick in his article, "The Tsar's Opponent." Rather than working to decentralize power, Putin has endeavored to insure "nearly all power in Russia is Presidential." In 2003, Putin had Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's wealthiest oil magnate, arrested and his corporations seized. Through a not-so-subtle method, Khodorkovsky's oil became the state's oil. Actions such as this show Putin's willingness to disregard democratization and use force to control the domestic, Russian, oil industries. Moreover, Putin uses his Federal Security Service to ensure that foreign corporations do not complicate business dealings with his annexed, state owned corporations. With the successes of China and Singapore for inspiration, Russia is on its own path to portray an image of democracy, while maintaining control through devious, subversive measures that can only be defined as authoritarian. As America bends slightly in this same direction, Russia's benevolent-state image will no longer be a priority.
Almond A. Almond, in his article, "Government and Policymaking," wisely contends that the "challenge of government is to control the excesses of top political leaders," and he cites the method of impeachment associated with the constitutions of the United States and Russia as an important tool for guarding against anti-democratic maneuvers by Presidents in these nations. While Almond admits this process is flawed, his optimism for impeachment as a tool to secure democracy is naive. Has the process of impeachment been debated in the Russian government after Putin's obviously undemocratic behavior? Has George Bush jnr., a President with the lowest approval rating since Richard Nixon, been asked to face his accusers through the impeachment process? The answer is no on both accounts. The methods designed to monitor either President's actions have been undermined by intricate power politics that can only be viewed as manipulative and authoritative. America may be perceived as a bastion of democracy, but the reality is that it shares many of the autocratic subtleties of Russia.
Developmentalist theories for understanding and predicting democratization began in a post-WWII America that was enthusiastic to proliferate what was seen as the most just system of government. As America moves away from true democratic processes and reaches for economic necessities around the globe, its inspiration and enthusiasm to spread democracy will weaken. Competition from global trading partners will also change this focus to meeting reciprocal economic needs regardless of a nation's ideologies. Perhaps, at some point in the future, when technology has provided a substitute for oil, democracy may again become the zeitgeist of the western world.

References:
Almond, et alia, "Government and Policymaking," Chapter 6 of Almond A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaare Strom, Comparative Politics Today: A Theoretical Framework, 5th ed. (Montreal: Pearson Longman), 2008: 133-167.

Barber, Benjamin R., "Jihad vs. McWorld," The Atlantic Monthly (March, 1992): 1-9 (taken from the Atlantic Online).

Crouch, Herald and Morley, James "The Dynamics of Political Change," in James W. Morley, ed., Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, rev. ed. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 316-354.

Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, "World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates," 2008. Energy Administration Website. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html

Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, "World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates," 2008. Energy Administration Website. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html

Energy Information Administration: Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, "World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates," 2008. Energy Administration Website. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm

Huntington, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations?" 1993. Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 22-49

Kaplan, Robert D., "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" Atlantic Monthly (December, 1997): 55-80.

Putnam, Robert D., "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy, 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 65-78.

Remnick, David. "The Tsar's Opponent," The New Yorker (1 October 2007): 65-77.

Wiarda, Howard J., "Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes," Thomson/Wadsworth Learning (2000).