Terror Masters, Dope Dealers, and Foreign Aid Scammers

Several years ago, while researching the extensive and confusing data on radical Islam in Pakistan, I read a number of articles by B. Raman and other experts on Indian national security. The wealth of information they presented about Pakistan’s devious maneuvers made me realize that Pakistan is one of the three epicenters of the Great Jihad, with the other two being Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In the heat of events during the fall of 2001 — when President Bush lauded Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan as a “friend of the United States” — it was easy to forget that the Taliban had been the creation of Pakistan’s security services, and were their preferred means of controlling Afghanistan.

If my analysis of the allover situation is correct, it would indicate the U.S. needs a different plan than the stepped-up counterinsurgency operation the ISAF report recommends, or at least a greatly altered plan.

It would also indicate that General McChrystal needs to yell at the top of his lungs, in public if necessary, about a holdover Cold War-era relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan that's getting many U.S. troops killed and injured for no good reason. And wasting billions of U.S. dollars.