What Gen. McChrystal Would Be Asked

by MilanSturgis | September 25, 2009 at 01:46 am

403 views | 57 Recommendations | 10 comments

As the debate of what to do next in Afghanistan and as it simmers near boiling the one question which underlies the debate is what is the root cause of the insurgency? This is a question that would lead off any possible testimony of Gen. McChrystal to Congress, if in fact that would ever take place but there is a growing bipartisan chorus that it does. The question that seek this answer could include; 1) When and why do insurgencies arise (root causes); 2) Why and how do some individuals become insurgents, and most importantly, why some do not; 3) How do insurgents sustain support?; 4) What are the main determinants of insurgent behavior?; 5) How do insurgencies decline in influence and authority?; 6) Why do people disengage or remove themselves from insurgent movements? These questions do not run the full spectrum that Gen. McChrystal could face if he does appear before Congress but they do touch on the main points that the current debate is structured around. The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly in the past year and continues to move “to the left” meaning it is moving in reverse not forward. If the US and ISAF forces can begin to answer the above questions there will be a greater understanding of why the insurgency has gained ground over the past 18 months to place it at that precarious position that Gen. McChrsystal so vividly described in his recent report to the President.

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Karl Gotthardt - albertacowpoke

at 02:22 on September 25th, 2009

All good questions Milan. Essentially in simplistic terms it boils down to what Maslow described in his Hierarchy of Needs

Lack of economic opportunity, i.e. the ability to provide for their families, government corruption and the lack of security all contribute to the insurgency. This is amplified with the tribal tradition in Afghanistan. It would appear that General McChrystal has addressed this points in his report. His assessment that security has to be provided before any progress can be made is accurate, whether it can be achieved is another question.

I think the U.S. Administration along with NATO is at a major crossroads. The strategy worked to some extend in Bosnia-Herzogevina, but Afghanistan is not Bosnia. Europe had a stake at restoring stability to the former Yugoslavia. I doubt that they have the same sense of urgency for Afghanistan. A good post.

Amy Judd

at 07:26 on September 25th, 2009

I wish I knew the answers to those questions - I think we all could do with some education on that, good piece.

Babel-Fish

at 07:29 on September 25th, 2009

The problem is more a case of knowing the enemy and what the enemy is capable of. Looking at the history of invasions of Afghanistan would be a great help. Once frustrated blame the tools of war when your not winning. I that's been done, yes well lets see Armour has to be 3 times as effective, wheels should never fall off due to very bad tracks. Oh yes helicopters, must have more of those for the enemy to shoot down.

This very argument was had in Moscow when the Russian Army was losing the battle.

The answer of course, more troops 10 times as many of course, oh yes of course there is not the man power the armies have been down sized and technology has become the answer to winning wars. Oh damn the technology is not as good as we thought it was, the enemy are taking pop shots, laying traps and then constantly hiding in a terrain they are more familiar with.

Well back to the drawing board but what a waste of life and cash.. Where is Rambo.. (tongue in cheek).

Karl Gotthardt - albertacowpoke

at 07:43 on September 25th, 2009

Yes Babel all good calculations if you.re fighting a conventional war. 3:1 is definitely the ratio you want to achieve.

In this case the question is what is the ratio? How do you protect against roadside bombing? do you line the routes with troops to make sure none are put out? Not very realistic. Even knowing the enemy here is not much help. The enemy is everywhere, amongst the very civilians you are trying to protect.

I doubt that the strategy with even another 48,000 troops will work. It almost seems that there were no lessons learned from the Russian campaign.

a211423

at 09:50 on September 25th, 2009

These are good questions Milan, and addressing the nature of the insurgency might reveal that winning in the conventional sense is not possible.

Is it reasonable to ask the general all of the questions because the military is faced with results of the social and economic issues that fuel the insurgency. The rule of warfare is know the enemy, but in Afghanistan the enemy is not clearly defined and constantly changes within geographical areas; therefore, a defined offensive position is difficult to judge and maintain in strength and manpower over time with current military strength. The power of insurgents to know and use the terrain in their favor, mobil enough to seemingly be everywhere, and a familiarity with the needs of the civilian population and communicate with them on their level give them advantages.

Which brings us back to what kind of solution are we seeking. A military solution or the "hearts and minds" solution. Also, how long will it take to have an Afghan army sufficient to handle insurgents if we agree that erradicating them is next to impossible, or does he believe the insurgency will decline, and if so, how long will it take.

MilanSturgis

at 10:00 on September 25th, 2009

Thank you for your insights, the way to look at this might be not trying to win the hearts and minds but rather deny the hearts and minds to the insurgents...maybe.

a211423

at 10:05 on September 25th, 2009

You are welcome : )

lalith

at 10:17 on September 25th, 2009

In insurgencies and its counters, the cause plays a major role. The sophistication of one side is countered by the strong cause or causes they are fighting for by the other.

Dosen't it finally boil down to the insurgents are fighting somebody who is paid to fight? So, in a solider, where does cause come in? Is it pay day or just plain carrying out orders which come down the pipeline?

Also, we must remember that the insurgents have the 'home ground' advantage.

Sophistication Vs. Cause? See what happened in Vietnam, Afghanistan (in the late 70s), Eritrea and many other countries.

One must think and act like an insurgent to beat one. Depending on sophistication may not hold water.

a211423

at 10:43 on September 25th, 2009

One must think and act like an insurgent to beat one. Depending on sophistication may not hold water.

Replace the word "insurgent" with "gurilla" and we are back in Viet Nam. : (

lalith

at 11:54 on September 25th, 2009

True.

During an insurgency, there is a so called active resistance phase. In this phase, insurgents do use a lot of guerrilla tactics and most of the time act and fight as guerrillas.

I think the problem with the US is one of pride. Don't want to pull out when they can or have to. Checking the bigger picture, isn't this something about a major oil pipeline which was planned through Afghanistan?

I don't think it is to maintain a balance in the region. Sometimes, it is difficult to fathom the changing foreign policies of the US.

They helped the Mujaheddin against the Russians in Afghanistan.

Was involved in the Iran Contra affair (Remember Oliver North?)

Helped Saddam with WMDs and weapons to fight Iran (Khomeini)

And many others. In my readings of International affairs, I try to avoid reading about US because their foreign policies change frequently.

Foreign policy or not, they must think about how many soldiers they are going to sacrifice before coming to a viable plan. Guerrilla warfare is deadly and usually long drawn.