Why Kashmir holds the key

Resolving the Kashmir dispute would help Pakistan to end its support
for Islamist separatists implicated in the Mumbai attacks

Muzamil Jaleel

Within hours after the 9/11 attack, Pakistan made a U-turn on its
Afghan policy, sided with the United States and became a frontline
state in the "war on terror". This sudden policy shift was major: from
having been a close friend and ally, the Taliban was now the enemy.
The Pakistan government showed no hesitation in joining the US-led war
against al-Qaida's Afghan bases and its backers, even though Pakistan
had been one of only two countries across the world that had
recognised the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

Three months later, a suicide attack on the Indian parliament pushed
Pakistan to the verge of an all-out war with India when New Delhi
accused two major jihadi groups based in Pakistan of responsibility
for the December 13 attack. New Delhi had sought the handover of 20
men, who included the leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammad, but Pakistan flatly refused. Though the threat of war
subsided after serious international, especially American, diplomatic
intervention, President Musharraf's January 6 2002 speech was greeted
with relief. Musharraf promised that Pakistan would not allow any
terror attacks to originate from its territory and subsequently banned
the organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Ever since, it has become crystal clear that the Pakistan government
has been consistent in its promise to fight Taliban and al-Qaida, even
at the cost of serious setbacks to its internal security, especially
along its western border. But Pakistan's efforts to tighten the noose
around Kashmiri separatist groups waging an irregular war against
India have met with limited success, even though the Musharraf
regime's crackdown against militant groups did lead to a substantial
decrease in violence in Kashmir.

Now, as New Delhi has blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for the Mumbai terror
attack, the threat of a war with India combined with international
pressure is forcing Islamabad to take new action. India's case this
time seems strong. They have released pictures of the Pakistani
terrorists alleged to have carried out the attack last month, provided
their addresses and sought the handover of several top jihadi leaders,
including the suspected mastermind of the attack, Pakistan-based
Lashkar commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi.

India has also taken its case to UN security council, seeking the
banning of Jamat-ud-Dawa, a group it deems a front for Lashkar.
Pakistan did initiate a crackdown, arrested Lakhvi and Jaish-e-
Mohammad founder Masood Azhar, and has consistently offered
cooperation in investigation of what it calls "non-state actors"
operating out of Pakistani territory. But it is highly unlikely that
Islamabad will ever be able to act wholeheartedly against groups like
Lashkar and Jamat-ud-Dawa in the same manner that they do against al-
Qaida – a distinction not appreciated by commentators like Robert
Kagan.

So the key question is: why is it impossible for Pakistan to hand over
Lashkar founder and Jamat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed to New
Delhi when it did not hesitate to arrest Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and
other key al-Qaida operatives for the Americans?

In a word, Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute is at the core of Pakistan's
very existence. Unlike Afghanistan, Kashmir has traditionally been a
major influence on Pakistan's domestic as well as foreign policy.
While Pakistan did launch a crackdown after the attack on the Indian
parliament, it continued to insist that this shift did not mean
abandoning its support for separatists in Kashmir.

There is another important aspect to this contradiction, which has
more to do with ideological and demographic differences between the
Taliban and Lashkar movement. The Taliban, in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, is primarily based on the Deobandi school of thought, while
Lashkar is Salafi. While Deobandis in Pakistan seek the establishment
of an Islamic state and support a jihad against the establishment,
Salafis do not support rebellion against the government in a Muslim
country and rather advocate reform to turn the ruling elite into
"Muslims at heart".

Lashkar-e-Taiba was launched with the aim of participating in the
Afghan war (against Soviet occupation). Its militants fought the
Russians along with the Afghan mujahideen outfit Itihad-e-Islami. But
as the Afghan war came to an end, the group decided to shift its
attention towards Kashmir. According to the security agencies, its
Kashmir valley operations began in 1993. For years, the group stayed
below the radar, so much so that government agencies had little clue
about its ideology and cadre. In fact, this Salafi group was in
conformity with official Pakistani policy, until 9/11 blurred the line
between armed insurgencies and international terrorism. And this is
precisely why Musharraf's decision to ban Lashkar was seen as a major
step, even though it did not meet New Delhi's demands.

A month before the ban on Lashkar, in 2002, Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed
called a press conference and officially distanced himself from
Lashkar, and instead set up Jamat-ud-Dawa, with an exclusive aim to
dawah (preaching) and charity. Lashkar was officially confined to Azad
Kashmir, and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi became the its supreme commander.
These measures appeared to work, so that Sayeed managed to evade a
complete shutdown by Pakistan government.

In contrast to its relative lenience on Lashkar, Pakistan has been
tougher on Deobandi groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, which was implicated
in an assassination attempt against Musharraf. Still, it is highly
unlikely that it will hand over Jaish leader Moulana Masood Azhar to
New Delhi.

Pakistan has another practical difficulty as well. While the Taliban
draws most of its cadres from the North-West Frontier province,
Lashkar's men are predominantly from rural Punjab. Thus any action
against Lashkar perceived to be taken at New Delhi's behest will have
grave political consequences in Pakistan's biggest province and the
hub of its political elite.

Whatever shape the latest round of hostility over Mumbai terror attack
between India and Pakistan ultimately takes, it has one interesting
aspect. Kashmir's separatist struggle is witnessing a historic shift
from violence to non-violence. The absence of militant intervention
during the current Kashmir election is testament to this new
phenomenon. But even if Pakistan did impose a ban on Jamat-ud-Dawa
under international pressure and took further measures against
Lashkar, Islamabad cannot contemplate a complete U-turn on Kashmir.
And Pakistan can never achieve a total commitment to "war on terror"
without a breakthrough in resolving the Kashmir dispute.

US President-elect Barack Obama's recent comments regarding the
urgency of resolving Kashmir to ensure Pakistan's full attention
towards war on terror along its border with Afghanistan shows that the
international community has begun to grasp the complexity of
Pakistan's situation. A solution to Kashmir would ultimately rescue
Islamabad and end its sanctuary of Lashkar-type jihadists. And, for
the first time, Kashmir is fertile for an Indo-Pakistani effort to
find a permanent settlement to the dispute.

source : http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/10/kashmir-mumbai-te...